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TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONALITY: A SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE ACTION IN
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES†
ABSTRACT
A fundamental aspect of many workers’ daily lives involves joining
coworkers in a common dispute to alter the circumstances of their
employment. This ability to collectively overcome repressive employment
practices and advocate for workplace improvements is derived from the
substantive protections afforded in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
In recent years, employees’ collective rights have come under attack from
employers shielding themselves from liability by prohibiting all forms of
collective action in individual arbitration. In addition, the Supreme Court has
adopted a hostile position toward invalidating arbitration agreements,
irrespective of the substantive rights they restrict. This combination threatens
employees’ fundamental rights and may radically change the foundation of
employment relationships. This threat stems from the perceived tension
between employment rights guaranteed by the NLRA and the enforcement of
arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Courts
across the nation have been thrust into the unenviable position of resolving
this conflict by choosing one over the other.
This Comment argues that the NLRA and FAA do not inherently conflict
and can be harmonized through the application of the effective vindication
exception. This exception, a Supreme Court doctrine, provides the optimal
solution by protecting necessary employment rights while favoring the liberal
enforcement of legitimate arbitration agreements. This Comment concludes
that the Supreme Court should adopt the effective vindication exception to
invalidate individual arbitration agreements that prohibit employees from
utilizing any form of collective action in an employment dispute.

†

This Comment received the 2016 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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INTRODUCTION
Labor law is in the midst of a rapid transformation.1 Stemming from the
rise of right-to-work laws and the decline in representation by formalized
unions, employees are increasingly dependent on individual protections
afforded by federal law.2 During this shift, economic inequality has increased
between employers and employees.3 Furthermore, workers continue to lose
influence not only in their individual workplaces, but also at the legislative
policymaking level.4 Employers and businesses have capitalized on this
climate by expanding the use of mandatory, individual arbitration agreements
to shield themselves from collective liability.5 The Supreme Court memorably
endorsed the use of this arbitration tactic in the interstate commercial sphere by
stating, “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with
[arbitration], even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”6 Modern courts
facing arbitration agreements, irrespective of conflicting statutory rights,
generally feel compelled to enforce them.7
The Seventh Circuit in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp. rebuffed the escalating
trend of individual arbitration agreements restricting employment rights.8 The
Court reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides an
employee the substantive right to collective action if the employee is
“engage[d] in concerted activities . . . intend[ing] to induce group activity”
against an employer to equalize the inequality of bargaining power between the
parties.9 This right invalidates arbitration agreements requiring the waiver of
all collective representation as an unfair labor practice.10 The court,
recognizing the threat to employment rights from the Supreme Court’s

1

See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2016).
See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 10–30 (2014); Jeanne Mirer, Right-to-Work
Laws: History and Fightback, 70 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 30, 38 (2013); see also Union Members Summary,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
(providing data about union membership in 2016).
3 Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 580
(2009).
4 Andrias, supra note 1, at 5.
5 See Andrias, supra note 1, at 6; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of
Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 90 (2014); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court
Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 92 (2012).
6 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
7 See Andrias, supra note 1, at 39; Wilson, supra note 5.
8 Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
9 Id. at 1152; see NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984).
10 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1154.
2
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expanded scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), stated the two statutes
do not irreconcilably conflict.11 In particular, the FAA’s policy of liberally
enforcing arbitration agreements could not validate an otherwise illegal
arbitration agreement.12
The Lewis majority further noted that its decision diverted from decisions
by various federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court.13 In the wake of
Lewis, both commentators and lower courts have struggled to reconcile
existing law without overturning precedent.14 This has created a vast federal
circuit split, pitting the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits against the Second,
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.15 This circuit split has produced uneven results
leading to unjust infringements upon the substantive rights of employees.16
Since the Supreme Court has decided to resolve the conflict, collective action
waivers in individual arbitration agreements are primed to occupy the national
spotlight during the 2017–2018 term.17
The impending Supreme Court decision will have far-reaching implications
on the future of labor law and may radically transform employment relations.
There is an inherent imbalance of bargaining power present in every
employment contract, as the employer has the power to dictate the terms and
policies of employment, as well as the method to resolve disputes.18 Individual
workers, regardless of their education or skill level, possess meager and
insufficient power to challenge an employer and enact changes in the
11

Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1157–58.
13 Id. at 1155; see Gordon W. Renneisen, Lewis v. Epic Systems: An Ongoing Debate Over Class
Waivers, LAW360 (June 13, 2016, 1:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/805857/lewis-v-epic-systemsan-ongoing-debate-over-class-waivers.
14 Compare Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that an
employer does not commit unfair labor practices by prohibiting collective action in an individual arbitration
agreement), with Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016) (refusing to enforce an
individual arbitration agreement prohibiting collective action).
15 See Daniel B. Pasternak, Sixth Circuit Joins Two Sister Circuits in Holding that Class Action Waivers
in Employment Arbitration Agreements Violate National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L L. REV. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sixth-circuit-joins-two-sister-circuits-holding-class-action-waiversemployment; Renneisen, supra note 13.
16 See Renneisen, supra note 13.
17 Richard R. Meneghello, Good Things Come to Those Who Wait? Supreme Court Delays Class Waiver
Decision Until Next Term, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
d20f3372-2450-4ddc-b973-889d813fa99c. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court consolidated the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Lewis, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Morris v. Ernst & Young, and the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Murphy Oil USA v. NLRB. Id. With the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court
has decided to postpone deciding these cases until the 2017–2018 term. Id.
18 See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2279 (2012); Bagchi, supra note 3.
12
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workplace.19 Left to their own devices, employees are routinely subjected to
adhesion contracts, misclassification of employment duties and obligations,
lost wages, and unsafe working conditions.20 These examples demonstrate the
importance of an employee’s ability to band together with similarly situated
coworkers in a collective action against an employer. This represents the only
effective method to equalize the parties’ bargaining powers and enact changes
in the workplace.
This Comment argues that the protections afforded by Congress in
Section 7 of the NLRA include the right of employees to join together in
collective suits against an employer. An employer cannot force an employee to
waive this substantive right by requiring individual arbitration to resolve
disputes. This Comment argues that the FAA does not demand enforcement of
these arbitration agreements and that the NLRA and FAA can be harmonized
to guarantee the protections afforded by both statutes. To accomplish this feat,
this Comment further argues that the effective vindication exception, a
Supreme Court doctrine used to invalidate contracts acting as a “prospective
waiver of a party’s right to pursue substantive remedies,” should be applied.21
The application of this doctrine protects the substantive rights afforded by the
NLRA while ensuring valid arbitration agreements are liberally enforced by
their terms.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the history of the
NLRA and FAA. Part II examines class and collective action waivers,
including Supreme Court decisions, the position taken by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”), and the deference given to the Board’s
position by courts. Part III explores the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lewis and
the circuit split that has emerged in its wake. Part IV argues for the application
of the effective vindication exception to harmonize the FAA and NLRA.
I. BACKGROUND OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The current state of collective action waivers in individual arbitration
agreements is best understood through the historical development of
congressional intervention into private employment contracts. Section A
discusses the history of the NLRA, including its enactment, protections, and
19

See Colvin, supra note 5, at 71–72.
See Bagchi, supra note 3, at 582; Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution
in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766 (2002).
21 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
20
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judicial deference. Section B examines the FAA, including its purpose, scope,
and subsequent interpretations.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
In 1935, Congress enacted the Wagner Act, styled as the National Labor
Relations Act, and created a new independent agency, the National Labor
Relations Board.22 The Board is comprised of three members appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.23 Its primary function is to “enforce
employee rights” and “endorse[] the principles of exclusive representation and
majority rule.”24 Congress enacted the NLRA due to the “denial by some
employers of the right of employees to organize,” their “refusal to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining,” and “[t]he inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract.”25 The expansive coverage of “employees” includes nearly
all private-sector employees, subject to only a few well-delineated
exceptions.26 This section first discusses Section 7 of the NLRA, which
provides employees substantive rights in employment.27 Then, this section
examines Section 8, which enforces those protections against employers.28
Section 7, the heart of the NLRA, guarantees an employee substantive
rights and benefits that are free and independent from employer interference.29
In relevant part, Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through

22 The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited May 14, 2017).
23 Id.
24 Id.; see NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984) (explaining that Congress enacted
the NLRA to “equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his employer by allowing employees
to band together in confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of their employment”).
25 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
26 Are You Covered?, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whatslaw/employees/i-am-represented-union/are-you-covered (last visited May 14, 2017). Employees excluded
from coverage under the NLRA include certain “public-sector employees . . . , agricultural and domestic
workers, independent contractors, workers employed by a parent or spouse, employees of air and rail
carriers . . . , and supervisors.” Id.
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
28 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
29 Interfering with Employee Rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.
gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-7-8a1 (last visited May 14,
2017).
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representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities . . . .30

Section 7 is important due to the substance and breadth of the protections it
guarantees. “Concerted activities” and “mutual aid or protection” are not
defined in the NLRA, which allows Section 7 to provide protections to an
employee’s activities in a wide range of situations.31 Given the ordinary
meanings of “concerted” and “activities,” “concerted activities” should be
done in a planned and deliberated way, usually by several or many people for a
particular purpose.32 The Supreme Court has interpreted concerted activities to
embrace “the activities of employees who have joined together in order to
achieve common goals.”33 This includes a single employee acting alone when
the employee “intends to induce group activity” or “acts as a representative of
at least one other employee.”34 “Mutual aid or protection” encompasses an
employee’s efforts to improve the terms and conditions of employment
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.35
Section 8, the enforcement clause, mandates that an employer cannot
“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7]” without committing unfair labor practices.36 “The
Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”37

30

29 U.S.C. § 157.
See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
32 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, Activities, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
activities (last visited May 14, 2017); MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, Concerted, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/concerted (last visited May 14, 2017).
33 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984).
34 Id. at 831(citation omitted); see Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of
employment is ‘concerted activity’ under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.”) (emphasis in original);
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Activity is concerted . . . even where only
one employee is involved if the employee is enlisting the support of fellow employees.”).
35 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978).
36 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
37 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012).
31
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The Board is afforded significant judicial deference in its application of
Section 7 stemming from its expertise in labor law.38 Courts will defer to
plausible inferences drawn by the Board, even if the court would otherwise
reach a contrary result.39 Furthermore, the Board possesses the power to define
the scope of Section 7, giving the Board considerable deference to any
reasonable construction.40 Therefore, a court interpreting whether employees
can engage in joint representation under an employment contract should
analyze the substantive protections guaranteed by the NLRA, as well as the
Board’s interpretations of those protections.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress codified the usage of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution through the FAA.41 Congress enacted the FAA to combat the severe
hostility against arbitration agreements prevalent in both state and federal
courts.42 This section explores various aspects of the FAA, including
interpretations by the Supreme Court, the benefits intended by Congress, and
the disadvantages presented by the arbitral forum, particularly in the
employment context.
Section 2 is the main thrust of the FAA and specifically mandates the
enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal courts, and has been
interpreted to apply in state courts as well.43 Section 2 states: “A written
provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”44
The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2 as reflecting a “congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” that requires courts
38 See J. Vallery Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.3d 446, 450 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Our deference extends to our
review of both the Board’s findings of fact and its application of the law. It does not extend to the Board’s
legal conclusions, including its interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement . . . .”).
39 See id.
40 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984).
41 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
42 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); David S. Clancy & Matthew
M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63
BUS. LAW. 55, 58 (2007).
43 Claudia Salomon & Samuel de Villiers, The United States Federal Arbitration Act: A Powerful Tool
for Enforcing Arbitration Agreements and Arbitration Awards, LEXISNEXIS (Apr. 17, 2014), https://m.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/the-us-fed-arbitration-act.
44 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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to treat arbitration agreements as equally as other private contracts and enforce
them according to their terms.45 Section 2’s savings clause allows the
invalidation of arbitration agreements by utilizing “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” that cannot be
derived solely because an arbitration agreement is at issue.46 Furthermore, the
Court has stated that the FAA preempts all state laws that conflict with its
spirit and purpose.47
While the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to apply broadly in
commercial contracts, the Court has not provided guidance concerning the
scope of the FAA outside the commercial sphere.48 It is clear from the
legislative history that Congress intended to limit the scope of the FAA.49
Specifically, Congress intended to place commercial (between merchants) and
admiralty contracts on equal footing with other contracts to avoid expensive
and prolonged litigation.50 Professor Van Wezel Stone noted that the “FAA
was intended to facilitate self-regulation within commercial communities, not
to regulate relationships between consumers and large corporations.”51
Congress did not intend to require binding arbitration if the parties possessed
unequal bargaining power, such as in employment contracts.52
By providing arbitration agreements federal protection, Congress intended
to promote certain benefits such as prompt resolution to disputes, a less
expensive forum, and procedurally streamlined rules to create an informal

45 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
46 AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 339; see 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 355
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“Contract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement—such as public
policy—[cannot] be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”).
47 See AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion) (“Because it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress,’ . . . California’s . . . rule is preempted by the FAA.” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
48 See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 100 (2006) (arguing that the Court has
interpreted the FAA “to cover worker agreements, which had been expressly excluded by Congress”); Robert
Iafolla, NLRB Asks High Court to Prohibit Class-Action Waivers for Employees, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2016,
4:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-employment-classaction-idUSL1N1BO1O5.
49 H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 55 (2011) (“[A]rbitration was initially conceived as a privately-run,
voluntary process for resolving disputes, mainly between businesses . . . .”).
50 Id.
51 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, RusticJustice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 942 (1999).
52 H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 55–56.
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process.53 The inexpensive but dependable arbitration process is favored over
litigation in certain disputes that prove to be costly, time consuming, and
troublesome.54 This advantage is most applicable in commercial disputes
because “arbitration is a very direct and expeditious method [and] courts are so
clogged that it is sometimes years before they can reach a settlement.”55
Moreover, Congress found the face-to-face and voluntary nature of arbitration
to be advantageous.56
The arbitral forum also creates significant disadvantages. In employment
disputes, arbitration exacerbates the inequality of bargaining power between
parties due to its secret nature and the drafter’s ability to dictate the terms.57
Since the arbitration process avoids the public court system, parties forfeit
various civil protections afforded in litigation.58 Furthermore, parties often
endure debilitating, and often unanticipated, disadvantages.59
II. THE HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS
As arbitration contracts became more liberally implemented and enforced
by courts, their usage spread across several areas of civil disputes.60 After the
Supreme Court endorsed the use of arbitration to resolve state law claims in
Southland Corp. v. Keating, businesses and employers began crafting contracts
implementing individual arbitration to resolve disputes.61 This practice

53

See Clancy & Stein, supra note 42, at 59.
Id.
55 Id. (quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 2–3 (1923) (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Arbitration Committee of the New York
Chamber of Commerce)).
56 Id. at 60–61.
57 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 56 (2011).
58 Id. These include “undermining the role of Article III courts, . . . limiting associational rights, . . . and
constricting access to law by enforcing bans on the collective pursuit of claims.” See Judith Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE
L.J. 2804, 2810 (2015) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions have created an unconstitutional system
that shifts adjudication access away from public courts towards private, arbitral organizations that are insulated
from tests of fairness).
59 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 109–10 (2010). The negative factors of mandatory arbitration considered
include “high up-front costs[,] limited access to documents and other key information[,] limited knowledge
upon which to base the choice of the arbitrator[,] the absence of a requirement that arbitrators follow the law or
issue written decisions[,] and extremely limited grounds for appeal.” Id. at 110.
60 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233,
256–59 (2008) (noting civil disputes in areas such as securities, employment, and consumer transactions).
61 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (rejecting the view that the FAA only applies to
cases brought in federal courts under federal law and applying it to state franchising law); Thomas V. Burch,
54

STEPHENS_COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONALITY

10/10/2017 11:39 AM

167

exploded after the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
with more employers requiring individual claims without class
representation.62 The Board challenged this practice involving employment
contracts in D.R. Horton, ushering in a new era of activism.63 This decision
and the Board’s theory—both invalidating agreements containing class action
waivers—serve as the baseline for courts to reconsider collective action
waivers in employment contracts.64 This section reviews important Supreme
Court decisions pertaining to individual arbitration and collective action
waivers, the Board’s theory in protecting employment rights, and other
persuasive judicial opinions.
A. Supreme Court Authority
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the legality of individual
arbitration agreements containing collective action waivers in employment
contracts, the Court’s holdings in other contexts have served as persuasive
guidance for lower courts.65 This section reviews foundational decisions by the
Court in this area; analyzes the rapid acceptance of arbitration agreements as
valid in the commercial, business, and employment spheres; and examines the
Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC and Italian Colors.
1. Hostility in the Foundational Era
Historically, the Supreme Court has taken a hostile position toward
collective action waivers. In 1940, the Supreme Court in National Licorice Co.
v. NLRB held that an employment contract is unenforceable if it discourages an
employee from pursuing grievances against the employer in any way except

Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2011) (noting the addition of “arbitration
provisions to . . . consumer, employer, and franchise agreements” after Southland Corp.).
62 Wilson, supra note 5, at 96 n.24.
63 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
64 See Iafolla, supra note 48 (“The [Board] has invalidated arbitration agreements with class-action
waivers in dozens of cases since its groundbreaking decision in D.R. Horton in 2012.”). Compare Morris v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (adopting the Board’s position in D.R. Horton), with
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the Board’s position in D.R.
Horton).
65 See, e.g., Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1020–21; D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348, 362 (5th
Cir. 2013); Daniel B. Pasternak & Shar Bahmani, The Seventh Circuit Goes It Alone, NAT’L L. REV. (May 26,
2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/seventh-circuit-goes-it-alone-upholds-nlrb-decision-holding-classand-collective.
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personally.66 The Court held that the contract thwarted the policy of the
NLRA, and employers cannot “set at naught the [NLRA] by inducing their
workmen to agree not to demand performance of the duties which it
imposes.”67
Four years later in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, the Court held that an
employment contract cannot limit the scope of the employer’s duty to bargain
with a union.68 The Supreme Court reasoned that an individual contract may
not defeat the procedures proscribed by the NLRA or limit an employee’s right
to bargain collectively.69 The Court held that whenever private contracts
conflict with the Board’s functions of preventing unfair labor practices, the
private contracts must yield, or the NLRA would be rendered futile.70 An
individual contract cannot waive an employee’s collective bargaining benefits
because the NLRA protects these rights.71
2. The Creation of the Effective Vindication Exception
After the Court’s foundational rulings regarding collective action waivers,
it began looking at these waivers in conjunction with arbitration agreements.72
Forty years after its decision in J.I. Case Co., the Court in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth fashioned the “effective vindication
exception,” which prevents the enforcement of an individual contract that
deprives a person of a statutory right.73 The majority declared that the
exception invalidates arbitration agreements that “operate[] . . . as a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”74 However,
the Court limited the doctrine’s application, stating “so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent

66 Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940). The Court’s decision upheld the position
previously taken by the Board. See Nat’l Licorice Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 537 (1938).
67 Nat’l Licorice Co., 309 U.S. at 361, 364.
68 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
69 Id. at 338.
70 Id. at 337.
71 Id. at 338.
72 Katherine V.W. Stone, Will Workers and Consumers Get Their Day in Court?, PROSPECT.ORG (May 5,
2016), http://prospect.org/article/will-workers-and-consumers-get-their-day-court-0.
73 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635–37 (1985).
74 Id. at 637 n.19.
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function.”75 The Court subsequently applied the effective vindication exception
in analyzing various arbitration agreements.76
3. Rigorous Enforcement by the Modern Court
As arbitration agreements became more popular in a wide array of contexts,
the modern Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts has vigorously
enforced these agreements. In AT&T Mobility LLC, the Court delivered an
impactful decision concerning collective action and arbitration.77 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the FAA preempted a state law
barring class action waivers in commercial contracts.78 This allowed the Court
to uphold a corporation’s contract that required customers to bring all claims
individually in arbitration.79
Justice Scalia stressed that the FAA reflects a “liberal policy favoring
arbitration” as a dispute resolution method.80 Congress requires courts to
“place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, . . . and
enforce them according to their terms.”81 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
savings clause renders some arbitration agreements unenforceable, but
determined that “nothing in [the savings clause] suggests an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”82

75

Id. at 637.
See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273-74 (2009) (stating that “a substantive waiver of
federally protected civil rights will not be upheld,” but declining to decide the question in this case because it
“require[d] resolution of contested factual allegations”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
28 (1991) (holding that certain statutory claims designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [the] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum”).
77 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (5-4 decision).
78 Id. at 352.
79 Id. at 336.
80 Id. at 339.
81 Id. (first citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); then citing Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). But see Wilson,
supra note 5, at 107 (“The savings clause of section 2 promotes the congressional purpose behind the FAA . . .
by placing arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts . . . . If arbitration agreements are
favored to the point that federal law seeks to promote arbitration, then generally applicable state laws are
bound to conflict with this favoritism policy.”).
82 AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 343.
76
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Justice Scalia highlighted certain advantages of arbitration and the way in
which class-wide arbitration sacrifices those benefits.83 The purpose of
arbitration is “to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type
of dispute” in a particular field.84 Furthermore, the informal nature of
arbitration is desirable because it can reduce costs and provide speedy
resolution to disputes.85 The switch from individual arbitration to class
arbitration sacrifices the informality of the process; it involves absent parties,
requires burdensome procedures, and raises the stakes for defendants.86
Justice Scalia envisioned the largest cost to corporations in class-wide
arbitration to be the increased risk of loss.87 Without individual arbitration,
corporations would be flooded with “tens of thousands of potential
claimants . . . aggregated and decided at once” in a process lacking review,
“mak[ing] it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.”88 Also, defendants
might feel compelled to settle questionable or unfounded claims at the
possibility of a large loss.89 The idea that class proceedings are necessary to
adjudicate small claims that would “otherwise slip through the legal system,”
Justice Scalia stated that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”90
In dissent, Justice Breyer rejected the notion that the FAA’s principal goal
is the expeditious resolution of claims.91 Instead, courts are required to “apply
the terms of the [FAA] without regard to whether the result would be ‘possibly
inefficient.’”92 Justice Breyer stressed that Congress intended the FAA to only
apply when merchants possessing relatively equal bargaining power “sought to
resolve disputes of fact, not law, under the customs of their industries.”93
Furthermore, class actions promote efficiency since a single proceeding is
more efficient than various separate proceedings for identical claims.94 Finally,
Justice Breyer argued that the FAA’s expanded scope would “immunize an
83

Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 344. Justice Scalia argued a significant advantage of arbitration lay in its secret nature, which
allows for the protection of confidentiality and trade secrets. Id. at 344–45.
85 Id. at 345.
86 Id. at 348.
87 Id. at 350.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 351.
91 Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219, 217 (1985)).
93 Id. at 362.
94 Id. at 363.
84
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arbitration agreement from judicial challenge . . . [and] elevate it over other
forms of contract.”95 This discourages potential plaintiffs from bringing claims,
making the “realistic alternative to a class action . . . not 17 million suits, but
zero individual suits.”96
Two years after its decision in AT&T Mobility, the Supreme Court revisited
individual arbitration and class action waivers in the antitrust sphere. The
Court in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant held that the FAA
does not permit courts to invalidate arbitration agreements that prohibit class
actions because a plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a statutory claim
exceeds the potential recovery.97 Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority,
argued that excessive cost is not sufficient to override the FAA, even if the
individual claims are prohibitively expensive and unlikely to be litigated.98
Justice Scalia refused to apply the effective vindication exception, stating that
although the claims are too small to be “worth the expense involved in proving
a statutory remedy, it does not eliminate the right to pursue that remedy.”99
In dissent, Justice Kagan argued for the application of the effective
vindication exception to invalidate arbitration agreements containing class
action waivers.100 According to Justice Kagan, the effective vindication
doctrine exists to
[P]revent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s ability to
enforce congressionally [guaranteed] rights . . . [and] bars applying
such a clause when (but only when) it operates to confer immunity
from potentially meritorious federal claims . . . by reconcil[ing] the
[FAA] with all the rest of federal law.101

The effective vindication doctrine furthers the purpose of the FAA by
ensuring arbitration remains a real method of dispute resolution, not merely a
foolproof method of allowing defendants to insulate themselves from valid

95

Id. at 366 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
97 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (5-3 decision). Justice
Sotomayor recused herself from rendering judgment in this case. See also Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Sides
with American Express on Arbitration, WASH. POST (June 20, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/supreme-court-sides-with-american-express-on-arbitration/2013/06/20/dc78c022-d9dc-11e2-a016-925
47bf094cc_story.html?utm_term=.d27807d9a0c8.
98 Id. at 2307.
99 Id. at 2311.
100 Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
101 Id.
96
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claims.102 The doctrine only applies when a contract provision completely
eliminates a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate a statutory violation.103 The doctrine
ensures that party does not forfeit substantive rights by merely agreeing to
arbitrate a claim.104
Justice Kagan concluded her dissent by urging for the harmonization of the
FAA with other competing federal laws.105 According to Justice Kagan, the
majority’s under-application of the effective vindication rule is merely an
extension of the Court’s attitude “bent on diminishing the usefulness of [class
and collective actions, making] everything look[] like a class action, ready to
be dismantled.”106 Whenever the FAA may conflict with another federal law,
“one law does not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication
rule serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them.”107 The
harmonization of the FAA and other federal statutes is necessary when the
arbitration clause “bars not just class actions, but also all mechanisms . . . for
joinder or consolidation of claims.”108
In summation, the Supreme Court’s recent trend is the strict enforcement of
arbitration agreements, irrespective of whether the agreement subverts other
statutory rights.109 Recent opinions indicate the Court’s viewpoint has shifted
toward hostility in invalidating arbitration agreements on any grounds except
traditional contract defenses.110 This attitude threatens employees’ rights to
engage in concerted activity, such as class and collective actions, when barred
by an arbitration clause.111 However, other Justices have advocated for a
narrower FAA and a greater ability for plaintiffs to exercise statutory rights

102

Id. at 2315.
Id. (“‘[S]peculative’ risks, ‘unfounded assumptions,’ and ‘unsupported statements’ will not suffice.”
(citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 & n.6 (2000))).
104 Id. at 2314 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628, 637
(1985)); see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (instructing courts not to enforce
an arbitration agreement that effectively forecloses a plaintiff from remedying the violation of a federal
statutory right).
105 See id. at 2320.
106 Id.
107 Id. Justice Kagan stressed that the ages of the statutes do not matter because the effective vindication
exception asks the same question: “Does the arbitration agreement foreclose a party . . . from effectively
vindicating the substantive rights the statute provides?” Id. at 2319.
108 Id. at 2318.
109 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 395 n.115 (2005).
110 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312–13 (Thomas, J., concurring).
111 See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 884 (2016).
103
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that are foreclosed in arbitration agreements.112 This is indicated by Justice
Kagan’s revitalization of the effective vindication exception and its potential
application to employment contracts. This Supreme Court divide, without a
clear answer on the discrete question, has led the Board and lower courts to
rule inconsistently.
B. The Position of the National Labor Relations Board
The Board’s position concerning collective action plays a significant role in
the tension between the NLRA and FAA. The Board made an early and
foundational decision concerning collective action waivers in J.H. Stone &
Sons.113 In J.H. Stone, the Board invalidated an employment contract that
required employees to resolve disputes individually with the employer through
arbitration.114 The Board stated that the restriction allowed the employer, at the
“earliest and most crucial stage” of the dispute, to restrict a worker’s right to
joint representation, thereby pitting the worker’s “individual bargaining
strength against the superior bargaining power of the employer.”115 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding, declaring the contract restriction
a per se violation of the NLRA because “the employee was obligated to
bargain individually and . . . [constituted] a restraint upon collective action.”116
In furtherance of J.H. Stone, and in tension with AT&T Mobility, the Board
in D.R. Horton held that an employer engages in unfair labor practices by
requiring employees to waive all collective action rights and resolve disputes
in individual arbitration.117 The main thrust of the Board’s opinion argued that
Section 7 protects employees who pursue collective action against an
employer.118 This rendered the contract unenforceable as an unfair labor
practice under Section 8.119 The Board stated that Congress, “[i]n enacting the
NLRA, expressly recognized and sought to redress ‘[t]he inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association . . . and employers.’”120 Efforts to collectively address harms or

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
33 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1941).
Id. at 1023.
Id.
NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942).
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292 (2012).
Id. at 2278–88.
Id. at 2292.
Id. at 2279 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
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improve conditions in the workplace are the core protections afforded by
Section 7.121
Furthermore, the Board determined that an employee’s Section 7 right to
engage in collective action does not conflict with the FAA.122 Echoing Justice
Kagan, the Board reasoned that when a presumable conflict arises between the
protections afforded in the NLRA and those of another statute, “the issues must
be resolved in a way that accommodates the policies underlying both statutes
to the greatest extent possible.”123 The Board formulated three reasons that the
NLRA and FAA could be reconciled without violating the FAA’s liberal, proarbitration policy.124
First, the Board argued that while Congress intended that the FAA “prevent
courts from treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other private
contracts,” if those arbitration agreements conflict with the functions of the
NLRA, “they must yield or the [NLRA] would be reduced to a futility.”125 The
FAA cannot place arbitration contracts on a superior level above other private
contracts.126 For example, if a court upheld an arbitration agreement that
violated the NLRA solely because it implicated arbitration, then that agreement
would be imbued with superior protection in relation to ordinary private
contracts.
Second, the Board held that the Supreme Court has routinely invalidated
arbitration agreements that require a party to forgo the substantive rights
afforded by federal statutes.127 The right to engage in collective action is a core
tenet of labor law, not merely a procedural right.128 The Board explained that
while the process of class action certification for plaintiffs is procedural,
employees engaging in joint representation against an employer is substantive,
regardless of whether the employees are ultimately successful.129

121

Id.
Id. at 2284.
123 Id.; see Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2314 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
But see D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2013). Neither the Board nor the Fifth
Circuit on appeal formulated a test, baseline, or factors to guide courts in determining how to accommodate
and reconcile possibly competing federal statutes, thus, creating an ambiguity.
124 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2284–88 (2012).
125 Id. at 2285 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944)).
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2286.
129 Id.
122
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Third, the Board held that the FAA has never been interpreted to have the
power to enforce an arbitration agreement that is wholly inconsistent with the
NLRA.130 In particular, the Board challenged the tension created by the
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility regarding the enforcement of arbitration
agreements by their terms to facilitate informal and streamlined proceedings.131
Employment disputes are substantially different from consumer disputes in
which the enormous commercial defendant faces thousands of simultaneous
contracts and potential claimants in AT&T Mobility.132 By contrast, one
employer employs twenty employees on average; therefore, “most class-wide
employment litigation involves only a specific subset of employees.”133 Classwide disputes in the employment context are more similar to individual
arbitration than the nationwide commercial disputes in AT&T Mobility, and do
not sacrifice the main benefits of arbitration—speed, cost, informality, and low
risk—that Congress intended to preserve in the FAA.134 The Board concluded
that “an employer violates the NLRA by requiring employees, as a condition of
their employment, to waive their right to pursue” joint representation in any
judicial forum.135 Despite the Board’s criticism of AT&T Mobility, the Board
emphasized that its holding did not “rest on any form of hostility or suspicion
of arbitration” as a dispute resolution process.136
C. Rejection by the Circuit Courts
Although the Board has adopted the position that individual arbitration
clauses waiving an employee’s right to collective action are unenforceable,
federal courts did not initially agree with this viewpoint. In fact, the Second,
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits specifically rejected the Board’s position.137
The Fifth Circuit in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB rejected the Board’s
position and initiated the tension between the Board and federal circuit

130

Id. at 2287.
Id.; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
132 D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2287.
133 Id. The Board used data from the U.S. Census Bureau from 2008 to determine this number, which
included 5,930,132 employers that employed 120,903,551 employees. See id. at 2287 n.25.
134 Id. at 2287.
135 Id. at 2287–88.
136 Id. at 2289.
137 See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737
F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst
& Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
131
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courts.138 The court held that the NLRA does not contain a congressional
command overriding the FAA and that collective action procedures are a
procedural rule, not a substantive right under Section 7.139 The court
determined that an employer does not engage in unfair labor practices by
enforcing an arbitration agreement that prohibits collective action and requires
employment claims be resolved through individual arbitration.140 In 2015, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed this holding in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB and
refused to classify collective action as a substantive right.141
The Eighth Circuit in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc. rejected Horton because
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not contain a contrary congressional
command dictating that the right to engage in class actions overrides the
FAA.142 The court stated that it is “not obligated to defer to [the Board’s]
interpretation,” and found persuasive authority in that “nearly all the district
courts to consider D.R. Horton have declined to follow it.”143
In discussing the effective vindication exception, the Second Circuit in
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP stated that the doctrine could “invalidate ‘a
provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain
statutory rights.’”144 However, the Second Circuit deferred to the Supreme
Court’s holding that the effective vindication exception could not invalidate an
individual arbitration agreement by showing that the plaintiffs possessed “no
economic incentive to pursue [the] claims individually.”145 “[T]he fact that it is
not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”146

138

737 F.3d at 357.
Id. at 357–62.
140 Id. at 362.
141 Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1020. The Supreme Court chose to consolidate the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Murphy and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Morris with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lewis to decide them
all at once. See Steven Wildberger, Supreme Court Adds Sixteen Cases to its Docket, JURIST.ORG (Jan. 14,
2017, 9:14 AM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/01/supreme-court-adds-16-cases-to-docket.php.
142 Owen, 702 F.3d at 1055; see Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297.
143 Owen, 702 F.3d at 1054 (alteration in original); see Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072,
1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining to adopt the Board’s position in D.R. Horton because a number of other
courts have not deferred to the Board’s interpretation). In 2016, the Ninth Circuit overturned Richards and
held that an individual arbitration contract that prohibits collective action is unenforceable under the NLRA.
See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2016).
144 726 F.3d at 298 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013)).
145 Id.
146 Id. (emphasis omitted).
139

STEPHENS_COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

10/10/2017 11:39 AM

TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONALITY

177

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: LEWIS V. EPIC SYSTEMS CORP.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp. eschewed the
consensus among federal courts and capitalized on the absence of binding
authority to adopt the Board’s position on class action waivers in individual
arbitration agreements.147 Section A details the facts in Lewis and the court’s
interpretation of “concerted activities.” Section B discusses the harmonization
of the FAA and NLRA and the ensuing circuit split. Section C analyzes
important reactions to the decision in Lewis.
A. Collective Action as Concerted Activity
Plaintiff-appellee Jacob Lewis worked as a technical writer for defendantappellant Epic Systems, a healthcare software company.148 On April 2, 2014,
Epic sent an e-mail to its employees containing “an arbitration agreement
mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through
individual arbitration and that the employees waived the right to participate
in . . . any class, collective, or representative proceeding.”149 The agreement
included a clause stating that employees were “‘deemed to have accepted this
agreement’ if they ‘continued to work at Epic,’” thus giving employees no
option to refuse and retain their jobs.150
Lewis continued his employment at Epic; however, when he later engaged
in an employment dispute against Epic, he did not pursue his claims through
arbitration, but filed suit in federal court.151 Epic filed a motion to dismiss the
suit and compel resolution of the claim through individual arbitration.152
Lewis’s response deemed the arbitration agreement invalid and unenforceable
as a violation of the NLRA because it foreclosed his right to engage in
concerted activities with other employees for mutual aid and protection.153 The
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin agreed with Lewis, and
denied Epic’s motion to compel arbitration.154 Epic appealed this decision to

147

Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (2016); see Pasternak & Bahmani, supra note 65.
Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. Lewis asserted violations of the FLSA against Epic for employment misclassification and
deprivation of overtime pay. Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
154 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-CV-82-BBC, 2015 WL 5330300 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 11, 2015).
148
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the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing the district court erred by not
enforcing the agreement under the FAA.155
The Seventh Circuit first engaged with the question of whether Epic’s
arbitration provision impinged upon Lewis’s rights under Section 7 of the
NLRA.156 For Lewis to be protected and for Epic’s arbitration clause to be
unenforceable, the court determined that Lewis’s actions qualified as “other
concerted activity” under Section 7.157 The court reasoned that an employee,
even acting alone, “may engage in concerted activities when he ‘intends to
induce group activity’ or ‘act as a representative of at least one other
employee.’”158 The court rejected a narrow interpretation of “concerted
activities” that would cover only union activity and recognized that Congress
intended the NLRA to provide collective action remedies that allow employees
to band together and equalize the bargaining power of the employer.159 These
protections are the strongest when a private contract forecloses all
representative opportunities, not just formal class actions.160 The court stated
that contracts requiring the “‘renunciation by the employees of rights
guaranteed by the [NLRA]’ are unlawful and may be declared
unenforceable.”161 Epic’s individual arbitration clause constituted an illegal
labor practice because it required employees to waive all rights to pursue
collective action in any forum.162
The court recognized that its holding conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., which held that an
individual arbitration agreement may be enforceable where the employee could

155

Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151.
Id. at 1154.
157 Id. at 1154–55.
158 Id. at 1152 (quoting NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984)); see also D.R.
Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2279 (2012).
159 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1153; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that
class actions allow plaintiffs to vindicate their rights when they otherwise would have no realistic day in
court); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (recognizing that a “single employee [is
generally] helpless in dealing with an employer”); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686, 688 (1941) (arguing that collective suits provide an
effective way for workers to ensure the proper enforcement of their rights when they are in a poor position to
seek legal redress alone).
160 See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1154. The court noted collective actions, albeit not codified in Rule 23, greatly
predate passage of the NLRA. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
161 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 365 (1940)); see Brady v.
Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011).
162 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1154.
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opt out of the agreement without penalty.163 The Seventh Circuit responded
that an arbitration agreement prohibiting all collective bargaining is a “per se
violation of the NLRA and [cannot] ‘be legalized by showing the contract was
entered into without coercion.’”164 However, the Seventh Circuit did not
resolve the affirmative opt-out issue because Epic Systems conditioned future
employment upon signing the arbitration agreement, thereby falling squarely
within Section 8.165
B. Reconciling the National Labor Relations Act and Federal Arbitration Act
After holding that an individual arbitration agreement that waives an
employee’s right to engage in collective action is unenforceable under the
NLRA, the Seventh Circuit discussed the potential conflict between the NLRA
and FAA.166 Epic argued that even if the NLRA invalidates the individual
arbitration agreement, the FAA precludes the NLRA and resuscitates the class
action waiver in full.167
The court first stated that Congress enacted the FAA to make arbitration
agreements as “enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”168 Arbitration
agreements may be invalidated by a contrary congressional command or
“generally applicable contract defenses,” but may not be overridden by
“defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”169 However, the court refused to
hold that the perceived conflict between the NLRA and FAA could not be
reconciled, which would be required to enforce Epic’s arbitration agreement.170
A heavy presumption of coexistence exists in federal statutes, and without “a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,” courts must regard
each statute as effective.171 A court must harmonize two complementary
163

Id. at 1155; see Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that an arbitration agreement with an opt-out clause does not act as a prospective waiver of
substantive rights or violate the NLRA).
164 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1155 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir.
1942) (“This [prohibition of all joint representation] is the very antithesis of collective bargaining.” (citing
NLRB v. Superior Tanning Co., 117 F.2d 881, 890 (7th Cir. 1940))).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1156.
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)); see
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 97 (2012).
169 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1156 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)).
170 Id. at 1156–57.
171 Id. at 1157 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995)).
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statutes that embrace distinct scopes, purposes, requirements, and
protections.172 This presumption can be rebutted, leading to implied repeal,
“only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two federal statutes
at issue.”173
According to the court, Epic did not overcome this burden because there is
no irreconcilable conflict between the NLRA and FAA that requires implicit
repeal.174 Federal law provides that illegal contracts must not be enforceable,
and the FAA incorporates this basic principle through its savings clause.175
Epic’s mandatory individual arbitration agreement is illegal because it “strip[s]
away employees’ rights to engage in ‘concerted activities,’” thereby violating
Section 7 and constituting illegal labor practices.176 Thus, because the contract
is illegal under Section 7, it falls within the FAA’s savings clause, allowing the
NLRA and FAA to work in tandem.177
The court’s holding that the FAA does not mandate the enforcement of an
individual arbitration clause prohibiting collective activity conflicted with
other federal circuit courts.178 In particular, the court reasoned that the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Horton should not control because it relied on
inapplicable dicta from Supreme Court decisions, made no attempt to
harmonize the FAA with the NLRA, and vastly overemphasized the pro-

172

Id.
Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996)).
174 Id.
175 Id.; see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006) (arguing that illegality is
a sufficient defense to the formation of a contract under the FAA’s saving clause).
176 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
177 Id.
178 See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP,
744 F.3d 1072, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting, “[w]ithout deciding the issue,” that a number of courts have
“determined that they should not defer to the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton”); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB,
737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that an arbitration clause must be enforced because there is no
“congressional command exempting the [NLRA] from application of the FAA”); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 298–99 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting NLRA-based argument without analysis); Owen v.
Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2013) (rejecting argument that there is inherent conflict
between NLRA/Norris LaGuardia Act and FAA); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“It would be anomalous indeed if the FAA—which promotes arbitration . . . —were offended by
imposing upon arbitration nonconsensual procedures that interfere with arbitration’s fundamental attributes,
but not offended by the nonconsensual elimination of arbitration altogether.”). But see NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t,
Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The NLRA prohibits mandatory arbitration provisions barring
collective or class actions because they interfere with employees’ right to engage in concerted activity, not
because they mandate arbitration.”); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding the FAA and NLRA do not conflict).
173
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arbitration policy behind the FAA to the detriment of the NLRA.179 In
actuality, the NLRA is pro-arbitration and does not disfavor or mistreat
arbitration as a dispute resolution method.180 The Supreme Court has never
held that “anything that conceivably makes arbitration less attractive
automatically conflicts with the FAA” or placed arbitration agreements on a
more favorable standing than regular contracts.181 Instead, the Court has held
that the NLRA “extends far beyond [class actions] or arbitration; it is a general
principle that affects countless aspects of the [employment] relationship.”182
Epic unlawfully required Lewis to waive his Section 7 rights, making the
formation of the contract illegal and unenforceable under both the NLRA and
FAA.183
Finally, the court argued that collective action is a substantive right, and not
merely a procedural rule, because it “lies at the heart of the [employment]
relationships Congress meant to achieve in the [NLRA].”184 Section 7’s
protections are plainly substantive from the structure of the NLRA and form
the foundation on which labor policy rests.185 Since a party does not forfeit
substantive rights by agreeing to arbitrate a claim, the contract is invalid and
cannot be enforced.186
C. The Courts React: Acceptance and Rejection
After the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Lewis, other courts have ruled
inconsistently when faced with individual arbitration agreements prohibiting
collective action. Several courts have viewed Lewis as a persuasive reason to
adopt the Board’s position in Horton. Other courts have rejected Lewis and
179

Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157–58.
Id. at 1158.
181 Id. “The FAA does not ‘pursue its purposes at all costs’ . . . [and i]f these statutes are to be
harmonized . . . it is through the FAA’s savings clause, which provides for the very situation at hand.” Id. at
1159; see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its
purposes at all costs.”).
182 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1158; see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967) (“To immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge on [a traditional ground such as
illegality] would be to elevate it over other forms of contract—a situation inconsistent with the ‘saving
clause.’”).
183 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1159; see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006)
(holding that illegality “renders the whole contract invalid”).
184 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160; see Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 750 (1942) (arguing that Section 7 guarantees fundamental labor rights to self-organization and collective
bargaining).
185 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160 (citing D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2286).
186 Id.
180
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relied on the Supreme Court’s holdings in AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors.
This has created a large circuit split. This section first examines decisions by
federal circuit courts, and then reviews important district court opinions that
have confronted the issue.
Shortly after Lewis, the Ninth Circuit in Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and refused to enforce an individual
arbitration agreement that prevented all collective action by employees.187 The
court overturned its holding in Richards, stating that there is no irreconcilable
conflict between the FAA and NLRA since the FAA’s saving clause prevents
the enforcement of an illegal arbitration contract that waives an employee’s
substantive right.188
The court stressed that its holding did not pertain to disfavoring arbitration
as a means of dispute resolution, rather “which substantive rights must be
available within the chosen forum.”189 “The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the core, substantive ‘rights’ created by federal law survive contract
terms that purport their waiver.”190 Without regard to the forum used to resolve
disputes, “[t]he NLRA establishes a core right to concerted activity,” meaning
employees must be able to act collectively in the chosen forum.191 The NLRA
encourages arbitration as a means of dispute resolution; however, an employer
may not condition employment upon the waiver of a substantive right.192 If an
arbitration agreement were permitted to terminate an employee’s ability to
pursue collective claims, the NLRA would be rendered futile.193
While the Ninth and Sixth Circuits have adopted Lewis, district courts have
also followed its lead. An exemplary case is Tigges v. AM Pizza, Inc., where
187

834 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 987. The court argued that when substantive rights are at issue, the FAA’s savings clause works
in conjunction with the NLRA to prevent conflict. Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 989.
192 Id. at 989–90.
193 Id. (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944)). In May 2017, the Sixth Circuit became
the second circuit court to adopt the holding of Lewis by refusing to enforce an individual arbitration clause
that prohibited concerted activity, thereby deepening the circuit split. See NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d
393, 407 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Thus, [Section] 8 makes it illegal to force workers, as a condition of employment, to
give up the right to concerted legal action, whether that right is substantive or procedural.”); see also
Christopher C. Murray, Sixth Circuit Adopts NLRB’s D.R. Horton Rule and Deepens Circuit Split on Class
Action Waivers, NAT’L L. REV. (June 6, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sixth-circuit-adopts-nlrbs-dr-horton-rule-and-deepens-circuit-split-class-action (arguing that the NLRB did not prove that individual
arbitration agreements prohibit employees from jointly representing their legal actions against an employer).
188
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the District of Massachusetts held that employees have a substantive right to
collective action since “the very essence of labor right[s] under the [NLRA]” is
joint representation.194 An arbitration contract prohibiting all collective
representation infringes on an employee’s substantive right, and is not
enforceable by the FAA merely because it involves arbitration.195 An
agreement containing a clause allowing employees to affirmatively opt out of
its terms still violates the NLRA by creating a “second mandatory condition of
employment, which requires employees to affirmatively act . . . to retain their
Section 7 right[s].”196 Furthermore, an affirmative opt-out clause requires
employees to prospectively waive their Section 7 rights in derogation of the
congressional command.197 Therefore, the court refused to enforce the
individual arbitration agreement, irrespective of an affirmative opt-out clause,
because it prevented employees’ from exercising their statutory rights.198
While some courts have adopted Lewis, others have rejected its holding.
The Eighth Circuit in Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC v. NLRB relied heavily

194 Nos. 16-10136-WGY, 16-10474-WGY, 2016 WL 4076829, at *13 (D. Mass. July 29, 2016) (first
alteration in original). The First Circuit has yet to rule on this issue, allowing the district court to adopt Lewis.
Id. at *18. Notably, the court stated that the United States is distinct in “empower[ing] businesses to employ
arbitration agreement[s] to bar their customers from access to court.” Id. at *12 n.20.
195 Id. at *15 (quoting Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (2016)); see also Curtis v. Contract
Mgmt. Servs., No. 1:15-CV-487-NT, 2016 WL 5477568, at *4 (D. Me. Sept. 29, 2016) (holding that the filing
of a labor related civil action by a group of employees is a substantive right and cannot be waived by an
arbitration contract); Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1256–58 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
(holding that the right to act collectively is a substantive right and cannot be waived).
196 Tigges, 2016 WL 4076829, at *16 n.26. This case differs from Lewis because the employer did not
condition further employment upon agreement to the terms of the arbitration agreement. Id. at *15. Opt-out
provisions are increasingly popular in employment contracts containing class action waivers. See
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that an arbitration
agreement containing an opt-out clause does not violate the NLRA); Shepardson v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 15CV-05102-EMC, 2016 WL 1322994, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016) (“[T]he NLRA does not apply here
because Plaintiff signed a voluntary arbitration agreement with the opportunity to opt out, and thus elected to
arbitrate her employment-related disputes on an individual basis.”).
197 Tigges, 2016 WL 4076829, at *16 n.26; see On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No.
189, at *1 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 15-60642, 2016
WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016). But see Bruster v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 15-CV-2653, 2016 WL
4086786, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2016) (holding that an arbitration agreement does not impinge on the
plaintiff’s rights under the NLRA because the plaintiff could have opted out).
198 Tigges, 2016 WL 4076829, at *16 n.26; see Gaffers v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 829, 842
(E.D. Mich. 2016) (holding that a contract provision requiring employees to arbitrate FLSA claims “in an
arbitral forum on an individual basis is illegal and cannot be enforced”). But see Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199
F. Supp. 3d 284, 313 (D. Mass. 2016) (concluding that an employer’s “arbitration provision is enforceable
under the FAA because its class-action waiver is not illegal under the NLRA”).
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on earlier decisions to enforce a mandatory individual arbitration agreement.199
Specifically, the court determined that Cellular Sales did not violate the NLRA
by forcing its employees to resolve disputes in individual arbitration and waive
all forms of collective action in all forums.200 Furthermore, courts have
distinguished Lewis on the basis of an affirmative opt-out clause. In a
representative case, the district court in Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc. held that
an individual arbitration agreement prohibiting collective action is not illegal
when it contains an opt-out provision.201 These distinct lines of cases
demonstrate the significant circuit split created after Lewis that the Supreme
Court is tasked with resolving.202
IV. A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE EFFECTIVE
VINDICATION EXCEPTION
In the wake of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Lewis, courts have ruled
inconsistently on collective action waivers in arbitration agreements, creating
confusion and unpredictable results for both employers and employees.
Recognizing the far-reaching impacts of this issue that may redefine
employment relationships, the Supreme Court has agreed to resolve the circuit
split.203 However, the Court postponed deciding this issue until the 2017–2018
term, presumably because it now has a ninth justice.204 While the
postponement allows the dysfunction and inconsistency in courts to continue, it

199 Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013)). But see Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 F. App’x 40, 43 (2d
Cir. 2016) (concluding that Second Circuit precedent requires enforcement, but if the panel could “writ[e] on a
clean slate, [it] might well be persuaded . . . to join the Seventh and Ninth Circuits”).
200 Cellular Sales, 824 F.3d at 776.
201 Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-11334, 2016 WL 7439198, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27,
2016); see Johnmohammadi, 755 F.3d at 1077; Rimel v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 6:15-CV-2191-ORL-41KRS,
2016 WL 6246812, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2016) (holding that Lewis does not bind the court and the opt-out
clause saved the arbitration agreement from unconscionability).
202 See Riederer v. United Healthcare Servs., No. 16-3041, 2016 WL 6682104, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 14,
2016) (“There is an entrenched conflict among the circuits on the question in Lewis, and this court’s
reconsideration could not spare the Supreme Court the need to resolve the conflict. Multiple petitions for
certiorari in cases presenting this question are pending before the Supreme Court. That is the right forum for
[defendant’s] arguments.”).
203 See Wildberger, supra note 141.
204 Lawrence Hurley & Robert Iafolla, U.S. Supreme Court Puts Off Action on Major Class Action
Dispute, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2017, 3:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-classaction-id
USKBN15N2K0.
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presents the possibility of adding validity and finality to the Court’s
decision.205
This Comment contends that the NLRA protects an employee’s substantive
right to utilize collective action that cannot be waived by an individual
arbitration agreement. Furthermore, this substantive right is not inconsistent
with the FAA, and the two statutes can be harmonized using the effective
vindication exception. Section A demonstrates that employees possess the right
to proceed collectively against an employer under the NLRA. Section B
assesses the application of the effective vindication exception to individual
arbitration agreements in the employment context, distinguishes Supreme
Court holdings, and discusses affirmative opt-out provisions to urge for a
bright line rule. Section C considers possible implications for employers and
employees.
A. Protection of Collective Action Under the National Labor Relations Act
The text of Section 7 provides employees with substantive protections to
engage in concerted activities and bargain collectively with an employer.206
While the NLRA does not define the scope of “concerted activities,” the
ordinary meaning of the term protects individual employees pursing any joint
representation, not just formal union activity.207 Even the narrowest
interpretation of the phrase protects employees acting together in similar issues
against a common employer.208

205 Menghello, supra note 17. On April 5, 2017, the Senate confirmed Justice Neil Gorsuch’s nomination
to the Supreme Court to replace Justice Scalia. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed
by Senate as Supreme Court Justice, NY TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/
politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html. While Justice Scalia penned the most important Court decisions
concerning arbitration and class action waivers, Justice Gorsuch has not ruled on this issue. See Edith Roberts,
Judge Gorsuch’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2017, 10:33 AM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuchs-arbitration-jurisprudence/. However, Justice Gorsuch has ruled
against employers in employment dispute cases, has written strongly in favor of enforcing arbitration
agreements, has been skeptical of administrative deference, and has disfavored interpreting statutes to have
broad meaning beyond their text. See Ron Chapman, Jr. & Christopher Murray, Judge Gorsuch’s Arbitration
Decisions and the Future of Class Action Waivers in the Supreme Court, LAW360 (Feb. 1, 2017, 1:28 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/887293/gorsuch-and-the-future-of-class-action-waivers; see also Jay-Anne
Casuga, Gorsuch Would Bring Conservative Bona Fides to Labor Cases, BNA (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.
bna.com/gorsuch-bring-conservative-n57982083197/. These views may lead Justice Gorsuch to view both the
FAA and NLRA with skepticism.
206 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
207 Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016); see supra note 32.
208 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1153.
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In addition to the text of Section 7, the congressional purposes underlying
the provision as well as Supreme Court interpretations affirm this substantive
right.209 Congress enacted the NLRA to protect employees who are combining
their representative power to equalize the bargaining power against the
employer.210 Collective action is broader than a mere procedural rule211
because it has historically acted as an effective mechanism to protect
employees at the most critical stage of a dispute.212 To interpret Section 7 to
exclude joint representation outside of formalized unions is to erode the
foundation of labor relations: the guarantee that powerless employees may
band together to enact changes in the workplace.213 Since the power and
influence of unions have significantly diminished in modern workplaces,
employees must rely on individual protections found in statutory law.214
Therefore, the protection of collective activity under the NLRA must be read
broadly to facilitate the shift in protection from unions to individual
employees.
B. Harmonizing the National Labor Relations Act and Federal Arbitration
Act Through the Effective Vindication Exception
Protecting employees’ rights to collective action is not the end of the
dispute, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors
209 See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556, 565–67 (1978); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944); Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S.
350, 360 (1940).
210 See City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 832; Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 159, at 686.
211 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. A Rule 23 class action is a procedural rule because it establishes the necessary
steps for plaintiffs seeking class certification. The prerequisite elements of a Rule 23 class action include
“numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 349 (2011). “Unlike class actions, collective actions are ‘opt-in,’ meaning ‘members must actively opt
into the lawsuit, by filing an individual consent to join.’” Recent Case, Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1039 (2017). Therefore, collective actions do not involve
absentee parties, enjoy historical protections, and serve the necessary public policy of equalizing the collective
bargaining power between employees and employers. See id.
212 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1651 (3d ed. 2001) (observing that federal equity courts encouraged permissive joinder of
parties as early as 1872). However, the Court has held that other federal statutes that provide for class actions,
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, do not provide a substantive right. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
213 See Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565–66 (arguing that “concerted activities” protects employees engaged in
activities in support of other similar employees to “improve working conditions through resort to
administrative and judicial forums”); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 750 (1942) (holding that Section 7 guarantees a “‘fundamental right’ . . . to self-organization and
collective bargaining” (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937))).
214 See Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 10–30.
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further complicate the issue. This Comment agrees with the Seventh Circuit
that the NLRA and FAA must be harmonized to give both their full
meaning.215 However, this Comment contends that the best method to
reconcile the two statutes is the application of the effective vindication
exception.
1. Application of the Effective Vindication Exception to Employment
Contracts
As previously argued, Section 7 provides employees the substantive right
to band together and engage in collective action against an employer.216 Taken
in a vacuum, this substantive right would systematically invalidate any private
employment contract, through arbitration or otherwise, that purported to
restrict, eliminate, or waive those collective rights.217 However, employers
have relied upon the Supreme Court’s liberal expansion of the FAA to enforce
individual arbitration agreements in derogation of statutory rights. As courts
have noted, this appears to create tension between the two federal statutes,
leading to undue restrictions on employment rights.218 This section argues that
the effective vindication exception, a Supreme Court doctrine rarely invoked
by the Roberts Court, provides the most logical vehicle to harmonize the
policies and protections of the FAA and NLRA.219
The purpose of the FAA is to make arbitration agreements as enforceable
as all other private contracts without imbuing them with superior
protections.220 While the Supreme Court has authorized the use of mandatory
arbitration to resolve federal statutory rights, it has refrained from broadly
eliminating safeguards to those rights.221 Specifically, the Court has argued
that Congress enacted the FAA solely to provide parties an “alternative forum
215

See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016).
See, e.g., id. at 1153; Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2016); Tigges v. AM
Pizza, Inc., Nos. 16-10136-WGY, 16-10474-WGY, 2016 WL 4076829, at *14–15 (D. Mass. July 29, 2016).
217 See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1156 (noting that the mandatory individual arbitration agreement would clearly
be unenforceable if not for the FAA).
218 See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013).
219 Cf. Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine in U.S.
Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 377–78, 464 (2014) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s narrow
conception of the effective vindication doctrine improperly limits its helpfulness in ensuring the prosecution of
claims); Stone, supra note 72 (noting that the restoration of a robust effective vindication doctrine already
commands the support of four Supreme Court justices).
220 Tigges, 2016 WL 4076829, at *14 (citing Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1156).
221 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (arguing that the arbitration of a
statutory rights does not represent an alteration of the substantive rights protecting employees).
216
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for the resolution of claims”222 by “trad[ing] [courtroom] procedures . . . for
the simplicity, expedition, and informality of arbitration.”223 Congress would
not expect an employee to forfeit fundamental rights merely because the
employer decided to resolve the claim outside the judicial forum.224
The effective vindication exception is the optimal doctrine to reconcile the
perceived tension between the FAA and NLRA. Application of the doctrine
encourages the liberal enforcement of valid arbitration agreements, and renders
agreements that choke off substantive employment rights invalid under the
FAA’s savings clause.225 Allowing the FAA to enforce an arbitration
agreement, notwithstanding its foreclosure of an employee’s ability to pursue
collective relief, operates as a prospective waiver of a fundamental right in a
sphere Congress did not intended the FAA to cover.226 This creates a real, not
speculative, risk of an employer barring all methods to consolidate claims and
grant itself immunity from meritorious claims.227Application of the doctrine
encourages, not dissuades, arbitration as a dispute resolution method by
222

Colvin, supra note 5, at 74.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
224 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (stating that if a contract term in an arbitration
agreement “operate[s] . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . . we would
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement”); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st
Cir. 2006) (holding an arbitration provision unenforceable that precluded treble damages available under
federal antitrust law); Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding a severing
clause unenforceable in an arbitration agreement proscribing exemplary and punitive damages available under
Title VII); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 670 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding an arbitration
agreement unenforceable that limited remedies under Title VII); McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 285 F.3d 623,
626–27 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding an arbitration agreement unenforceable that did not provide for an award of
attorney’s fees in accordance with a right guaranteed by Title VII).
225 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the effective vindication doctrine exists to prevent arbitration clauses from foreclosing a plaintiff’s ability to
enforce statutory rights and from conferring immunity to employers from potentially meritorious claims by
harmonizing the FAA with other federal laws). It is important to note that the application of the exception to
employment disputes does not concern the excessive cost of vindicating a statutory right, an argument the
Supreme Court has rejected. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (noting
that high arbitration costs could preclude a plaintiff from effectively vindicating her statutory rights).
226 See Gilles, supra note 109, at 430. In regard to the Court’s expansive application of the FAA, Justice
Stevens has observed, “There is little doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far
beyond the expectations of the Congress that enacted it.” Id. at 395 n.115 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Further, Justice O’Connor has noted, “The Court
has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead,
case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” Id. (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
227 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90–91, 91
n.6 (noting that “speculative” risks, “unfounded assumptions,” and “unsupported statements” will not suffice).
223
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ensuring that arbitration “remains a real, not faux, method of dispute
resolution.”228 Thus, the effective vindication exception must be applied to
individual arbitration agreements that waive all methods of collective action to
ensure that the FAA and NLRA are reconciled to further the protections
afforded by both statues to the greatest extent possible.229
2. Distinguishing AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors
The application of the effective vindication exception to an employer’s
individual arbitration agreement distinguishes Lewis from the Supreme Court’s
holdings in AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors. First, the doctrine removes
illegal arbitration agreements from the Court’s expanded scope of the FAA and
places them within its savings clause. Second, the doctrine strictly applies to
resolve potential conflicts between federal statutes, not the preemption of state
commercial law or small antitrust claims. Third, the doctrine protects
employment rights while promoting the advantages and minimizing the
disadvantages of arbitration.
First, the effective vindication exception places an employer’s illegal
arbitration agreement within the FAA’s saving clause and, therefore, halts
modern expansion of the FAA into areas for which Congress did not intend. In
the wake of AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors, the Court’s endorsement of
individual arbitration at all costs, irrespective of the substantive rights violated,
fails to provide an adequate forum for employees to bargain collectively.230
Congress did not design the FAA to apply in employment disputes or to
supersede all other federal statutes.231 Employment contracts involve historical,
fundamental, and statutory rights wholly separate from the concerns in other
private agreements.232 These disputes are completely foreign to the types of
228

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th
Cir. 1942) (holding that a contract foreclosing all methods of collective bargaining constitutes a per se
violation of the NLRA).
229 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2283–85 (2012).
230 See Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 278–79 (2015) (arguing
that lower courts often feel compelled to enforce illegal arbitration agreements due to the Supreme Court’s
rigorous endorsement of the practice); Stone, supra note 72 (“The pervasive use of mandatory arbitration by
employers and retailers in their dealings with their workers and consumers is rapidly destroying innumerable
rights that were legislated by Congress over more than a century.”).
231 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308–09. The Court has endorsed a broad interpretation of the FAA
without taking into account the substantive considerations of the contract or other relevant statutes. See Moses,
supra note 48, at 100.
232 Cf. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in
Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 296 (1999).
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multinational, class-wide litigations intended to fall under the FAA. There is
no overwhelming need for streamlined resolution of claims or significant risks
of prolonged judicial deliberation.233 Furthermore, there is no risk of erroneous
claims involving thousands of fraudulent or absentee plaintiffs because the
disputes are remarkably smaller in number, concern identical employment
issues, and are brought against the same employer who once employed the
workers.234 Expanding the scope of the FAA to enforce illegal employment
contracts and supersede the NLRA would immunize arbitration agreements
from judicial challenge in a sphere Congress did not intend the FAA to
apply.235 This would elevate arbitration agreements over all other private
contracts, a situation inconsistent with the FAA’s savings clause.236
Second, the factual and legal issues at stake in AT&T Mobility and Italian
Colors are vastly different than the concerns in collective employment cases.
In AT&T Mobility, the Court dealt with the federal preemption of a conflicting
state law, not the type of substantive rights afforded by the NLRA.237
Collective employment actions are protected by a federal, not state, law that
focuses on the inequality between parties.238 Furthermore, the protections are
broader than a procedural rule, such as a Rule 23 class action.239 In Italian
Colors, the Court held the prohibitively high cost of individually litigating
small antitrust claims is insufficient to supersede the FAA.240 Unlike miniscule
antitrust claims that must be aggregated just to incentivize a plaintiff to bring a
potentially meritorious claim, Section 7 is the foundation on which all
employment relations rest.241 The right to collectively bargain in employment
disputes represents the only effective method to protect workers from
employers who possess the vastly superior power to dictate the terms and
methods of the employment relationship.242 The Court cannot rely upon
inapplicable precedent without analyzing the distinct issues at stake in Lewis

233 See id. at 299 (arguing that the Supreme Court has often overestimated the virtues of arbitration in its
decisions).
234 See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2287 (2012).
235 See Moses, supra note 48, at 100.
236 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (“To immunize an
arbitration agreement from judicial challenge on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it
over other forms of contract—a situation inconsistent with the [FAA’s] ‘saving clause.’”).
237 See NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 406 (6th Cir. 2017).
238 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1158 (2016).
239 See supra note 211.
240 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
241 See Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 750 (1942).
242 See NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942); Bagchi, supra note 3, at 580.
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and the debilitating effects of individual arbitration on employees. As Justice
Kagan noted, “To a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”243 While the Court
may see the FAA as a mechanism to automatically validate every arbitration
agreement, class action waivers in employment contracts have wholly distinct
characteristics and issues than those found in the narrow holdings of AT&T
Mobility and Italian Colors.244
Third, factual circumstances present in collective employment disputes
tend to promote, not discourage, the principle advantages of arbitration while
minimalizing potential adverse effects. The Court’s desired benefits of
arbitration include informality, streamlined procedures tailored to a type of
dispute, reduced costs, and “increase[ed] speed of resolution.”245 Unlike the
commercial context, class-wide employment disputes promote these benefits.
Collective employment disputes promote informality because the employer
once employed the plaintiffs, meaning the dispute involves familiar, not
absentee, plaintiffs.246 Furthermore, the employees are bringing identical
claims regarding a specific employment issue. This uniformity allows for
streamlined rules, crafted equally between the parties, to govern since the
parties are generally identical in their makeup and claims. In the employment
context, Justice Breyer’s words are persuasive because “a single class [action]
proceeding is surely more efficient than thousands of separate proceedings for
identical claims.”247 Since employment disputes promote the benefits of
arbitration, the Court cannot “immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial
challenge” and shield employers from potential losses resulting from their
conduct.248
Collective employment disputes also avoid the negative aspects of classwide arbitration. Courts have noted that class-wide arbitration increases the
risk to defendants, sacrifices informality, makes the process slower and
costlier, promotes procedural morass due to a high number of absentee parties,
lacks multilayered review, and provides poor protections of confidentiality and

243 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 n.5 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “to a Court bent on
diminishing the usefulness of [class actions], everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled”);
Chukwumerije, supra note 219, at 464.
244 See Edwards, supra note 232.
245 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011); see D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B.
2277, 2287 (2012).
246 See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B at 2287; Edwards, supra note 232, at 297–98.
247 AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 363 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 366 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
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trade secrets.249 While these concerns may be applicable to a commercial
business, they are largely inapplicable in the employment context. An average
collective employment dispute involves only a specific subset of employees,
and is more akin to individual arbitration than the tens of thousands of
potential claimants envisioned by the Court in AT&T Mobility.250 Generally,
disputes concern identical factual and legal issues of present employees, such
as employment classification, thereby making joinder more efficient and
expeditious than arbitrating cases on an individual basis.251 With a small,
substantially identical class of plaintiffs, there is no risk of procedural chaos
from absentee parties, and employers will not be pressured into settling claims
unless they are truly liable.252 Furthermore, access to the judicial system
ensures multilayered review, and disputes concerning trade secrets or
confidential information that require private arbitration are less common.
Enforcing collective action waivers would only discourage and dissuade
employees from bringing grievances against the employer.253 Employers and
employees are free to engage in arbitration if they choose; however, employers
cannot terminate an employee’s right to joint representation in the chosen
forum. Thus, since the policies in collective employment disputes are vastly
different than the commercial context, the effective vindication exception must
apply to invalidate individual arbitration agreements that prohibit collective
action.
3. The Affirmative Opt-Out Clause
While the factual situation in Lewis clearly violates Section 7 by
conditioning continued employment on the waiver of a substantive right, the
issue is complicated by the presence of an affirmative opt-out clause.254 This
Comment suggests that an affirmative opt-out clause does not save an illegal
arbitration agreement prohibiting collective action from invalidation because
an employee cannot be forced to preemptively waive a substantive right in
order to validate a claim. Furthermore, this Comment rejects the Ninth

249

See AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344–46; D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359 (5th Cir.

2013).
250

See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B at 2287.
See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION – NATIONALIZATION –
INTERNATIONALIZATION 172 (1st ed. 1992) (“One cannot immerse oneself in the arbitration cases without
coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the court is docket-clearing pure and simple.”).
252 See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2287.
253 See Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940).
254 Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
251
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Circuit’s reasoning in Johnmohammadi and advocates for a bright-line rule to
minimize the risk of employers manipulating Section 7 rights.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Johnmohammadi should not be adopted
because affirmative opt-out clauses allow employers to coerce employees into
forfeiting their Section 7 rights.255 The Court should not focus on whether
substantive rights are actually waived if an employee can affirmatively opt-out
of the terms of the agreement.256 Rather, the Court should ask whether an
“employer’s conduct reasonably tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights.”257 An employer requiring employees to take a second
mandatory step of employment to preserve their substantive rights, or else
permanently forfeit them, is a clear impediment to the operation of those
rights.258 This renders all agreements requiring the waiver of substantive
employment rights invalid, regardless of whether they contain an affirmative
opt-out clause.
Second, a bright-line rule of invalidation, irrespective of an affirmative optout clause, should be adopted to improve judicial consistency and promote
fundamental employment policies. A clear rule recognizes the inherent
inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees.259 This
promotes consistency in lower courts by affording all employees across the
nation identical substantive protections from employers who may attempt to
immunize themselves from potentially meritorious claims.260 A clear rule
resolves ambiguity and establishes a baseline for both parties, a feat the
Supreme Court and lowers courts have failed to accomplish in previous
decisions.261 Employers cannot require a prospective waiver of an employee’s
fundamental right at the most critical part of a dispute.

255 See Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014); NLRB v. Stone,
125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942).
256 See Curtis v. Contract Mgmt. Servs., No. 1:15-CV-487-NT, 2016 WL 5477568, at *5 (D. Me. Sept.
29, 2016).
257 See id. at *6 (emphasis omitted) (quoting On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189,
at *5 (2015)).
258 See id.
259 See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978); Stone, 125 F.2d at 756 (holding that a per se
violation of the NLRA is not legalized by showing the employer did not coerce the employee into signing the
agreement).
260 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2314 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
261 See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013).
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C. Possible Implications for Employers and Employees
Applying the effective vindication exception to invalidate all individual
arbitration agreements that prohibit collective action will have serious
implications on employers and employees. In so holding, the Supreme Court
would bolster the rights of employees in disputes and begin to cut back on an
overbroad application of the FAA.262 Furthermore, the Court would be
adopting a long-held, and often unpopular, position by the Board.263 One
implication is that both large and small employers must immediately change
their employment practices. Thousands of employers across the nation have
relied upon individual arbitration and collective action waivers to resolve
disputes with employees. Many employers would be required to immediately
revise their dispute resolution process.264 Another implication is that since
collective action is a substantive right, all employees would gain a significantly
increased ability to jointly represent their interests in disputes against their
employer, whether through arbitration or traditional litigation.265 This would
not disfavor arbitration as a process; rather, it would provide employers and
employees with options to fashion a dispute resolution method that best fits
both of their needs and objectives.266 A final implication is that large
employers may be more inclined to settle claims rather than expose themselves
to a collective penalty.267 Individual settlements may increase because
employers may no longer shield themselves from liability by implementing
contracts mandating the waiver of collective action, not because a large
number of claims are unfounded.

262

See Wilson, supra note 5.
See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2283 (2012).
264 See Allyson Ho & Scott Schutte, The Court After Scalia: Uncertain First Principles for Class Actions,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 7, 2016, 2:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-uncertainfirst-principles-for-class-actions/ (“The Court’s moderate-conservative consensus on class actions has proven
unwilling to reshape arbitration doctrines that would come at the steep cost of fundamentally transforming
arbitration.”).
265 Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration
Deprives Workers and Consumers of Their Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/
publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/#epi-toc-8.
266 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1158 (2016).
267 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (arguing that employers
faced with thousands of simultaneous lawsuits would avoid the risk of a huge loss in class-wide arbitration by
settling claims).
263
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CONCLUSION
An employee’s substantive right to engage in collective action against an
employer is the foundation of employment law. This right equalizes the
bargaining power of the parties and prevents an employer from immunizing
itself from liability for meritorious claims. In passing the NLRA, Congress
recognized these dangers and ensured that employees could not be coerced into
waiving this substantive right. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
demonstrate that the meaning of “concerted activities” has been broadly
construed to encompass employees acting in a joint capacity, regardless if on
their own or through a formal union. However, the Supreme Court’s expanded
scope of the FAA and liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements
irrespective of the rights they supersede threatens employees. The foremost
concern is that employers will gain more authority to completely foreclose an
employee’s right to act collectively and require all employment claims be
resolved individually in arbitration.
This Comment concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Lewis is
correct because Section 7 provides substantive rights that an employer cannot
restrict in individual arbitration. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court
should resolve the perceived conflict between the FAA and NLRA by applying
the effective vindication exception. The tension between the FAA and NLRA
must be resolved to promote the distinct policies and protections afforded by
both statutes.268 The adoption of the doctrine creates a bright-line rule
invalidating individual arbitration agreements that foreclose an employee’s
right to collective action while still liberally enforcing legitimate arbitration
agreements. This rule, regardless of the inclusion of an affirmative opt-out
clause, creates consistency and stability in employment relationships. While
the FAA mandates the liberal enforcement of arbitration, no legislation pursues
its purposes at all costs, particularly when fundamental employment rights are
at stake.269 The effective vindication exception ensures arbitration remains a
real method of dispute resolution and prevents employers from immunizing

268
269

See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2283.
See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987).
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themselves from potentially meritorious claims.270 Therefore, the effective
vindication exception should be adopted to invalidate individual arbitration
agreements prohibiting an employee from pursing collective action.
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